In the 1960s the Russians were attempting to develop their Intercontinental Ballistic Missile capabilities. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the Russians were so far behind us that they had to sneak intermediate range missiles into Cuba to have any hope of hitting us with a significant number of missiles. Firing missiles at us from Russia was, at that time, impossible. Once President Kennedy discovered, through US spy Oleg Penkovsky, that the Russians were behind in ICBMs, he could negotiate from strength and get the Russian missiles out of Cuba. One Russian problem in producing reliable ICBMs was in coming up with modern guidance systems, the require miniature precision ball bearings, and the lack of ability to produce modern accelerometers. This chapter of the "Russian Collusion" saga will deal with how elements inside the United States, government, corporations, academia, and the media teamed up to bring the Russian military force into the age of Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles, or MIRV technology, which is how one missile can carry multiple warheads that are independently targeted.
An accelerometer is an instrument used in missiles and aircraft to measure gravitational pull. In the mid-to-late 1960s, the Russians showed their interest in obtaining accelerometers from the United States. The methodologies the Russians chose to use included espionage, using Russians residing inside the United States as serving diplomats of the Kremlin. Using a diplomat to obtain an accelerometer provided the Russians with two advantages.
1. A diplomat enjoys what is called "Diplomatic Immunity," which is a legal term for a clause in the treaties governing diplomatic personnel of foreign countries who reside inside the United States. Diplomats are immune from arrest for espionage. They can be deported at the demand of the host country, and that is all.
2. Diplomats get the use of sealed diplomatic bags and pouches that are immune from search-and-seizure by the law enforcement agencies of the host country.
The House (of Representatives) Un-American Activities Committee (now known as the House Internal Security Committee) held hearings about Russian efforts to acquire accelerometers. Leonard I. Epstein, vice president of Trans-American Machinery and Equipment Corporation of New Jersey provided testimony to that committee about his encounters with Vadim Isakov, a Russian diplomat deployed to the United Nations organization known as UNICEF, or the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. Russian diplomat Isakov visited Epstein's plant in New Jersey requesting to purchase an accelerometer "made by American Bosch Arma Corporation or similar company."
This period coincided with Russia crashing three space vehicles on the moon. This was most likely caused by the Russians having to use obsolete accelerometers on those vehicles. A modern accelerometer, like the one Isakov was seeking, measures very small fluctuations in gravitational pull. An accelerometer that can measure such small fluctuations in gravity can enable a maneuvering re-entry vehicle to react timely to small, suddent fluctuations in gravitational pull. An accelerometer can enable a re-entry vehicle, such as a space craft like the Space Shuttle, or a MIRV warhead of an ICBM to react to sudden and subtle changes in gravitational pull. It is impossible to land a vehicle on the moon without that capability, and it is impossible to have a missile warhead able to guide itself toward a target. The Russians planned to incorporate such accelerometers into their missile forces, but had to find out how to retool their plants to get it done. As we saw in the earlier chapters of this series, Russians are good at reverse engineering, doing such things as reverse engineering the Sturmgewehr 44 into the AK-47 rifle. The Russians could figure out how to change the process of manufacturing obsolete accelerometers into producing modern acceleometers, but first comes the step of acquirnig one accelerometer for the reverse engineering
Russian diplomat Isakov aroused the interest of the FBI when Leonard Epstein informed them about Isakov's shopping list. The FBI advised Epstein to stall the Russian in order to discover Isakov's main interest. A UNICEF diplomat after sensitive instruments for space travel was an anomaly to the FBI. Not much can meet the emergency needs of international children by obtaining an accelerometer. Epstein did as the FBI advised and stalled Isakov by citing State Department and Commerce Department export regulations. Isakov exposed his main priority by suggesting to Epstein to forget about the regulations since Isakov had use of the diplomatic bag. When Epstein declined Isakov's request the contacts ended, but now the FBI knew what the Russian was after.
In August 1967, the Russians tried another approach. Under the Academic Exchange Program, run by the State Department, Russian professional educators could come to the United States to study specific subjects. Russian academic Anatoliy K. Kochev of the Kalinin Polytechnic Institute of Leningrad showed up at Catholic University of the United States for the academic year of 1967-1968. The subject Kochev came to the United States to study was, "construction methods of equipment to measure small fluctuations and displacements," which is what an accelerometer does.
The Russians had plants that could make obsolete accelerometers in 1967, but could not make the more precision accelerometers that could measure "small fluctuations and displacements." Russian spy/diplomat Isakov was after a sample of one for reverse engineering so the Russians could find out how their manufacturing facilities needed retooled to make the modern accelerometer, but that attempt failed. After espionage failed, the Russian government assigned Anatoliy Kochev to go the United States and find out how the accelerometer was manufactured. The Russian plants could then be retooled in accordance with Kochev's discoveries. Kochev succeeded in his assignment and brought the secrets of manufacturing modern accelerometers to Russia. A few years before this all happened, the Russian government attempted to obtain from the United States the means to mass produce precision miniature ball bearings in large numbers, which are necessary components of any modern targeting system for a missile warhead.
During World War II, the US Army Air Corps expended a high portion of their strategic bomber force to attempt to knock out German production of ball bearings. Eliminating German production was a high priority in the strategic bombing campaign against Nazi Germany as ball bearings are crucial components of many weapons systems, particularly tanks, self-propelled guns, and other military vehicles. By 1944, ball bearings were getting harder for the Germans to produce to the point that many Tiger tanks could not be fitted with some of the ball bearings the tanks required, which added to the maintenance time for the Tiger tank.
Contrasting the approach of the Allies to destroy German ball bearing production during WWII, the United States Government, during the Cold War, would give the Russians all of the ball bearings, and the machinery to make them, as possible while keeping mum about the consequences. The history of the United States providing Russia with ball bearing manufacturing equipmemt dates back to the 1930s, in a similar history as Dupont and Nitrogen Engineering Company building nitrogen refining plants to produce gunpowder and explosives, and the construction of "tractor" plants by Ford Motor Company in Gorki, Russia and Caterpillar in Chelyabinsk, Russia, that produced tanks for the Russian army. These are all dual-use facilities that can make products for either civilian or military use. The precision miniature ball bearing's uses are almost entirely military, with an emphasis on missile and warhead guidance systems.
In the history of the shipment of beall bearing manufacturing technology to Russia revolves around one US manufacturer, the Bryant Chucking Grinder Company (BCGC). Here is a chart showing the year, and the percentage of BCGC's output that was sent to Russia during the 1930s by BCGC.
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BRYANT CHUCKING GRINDER COMPANY--PERCENTAGE OF OUTPUT SENT TO RUSSIA |
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With the beginning of the era of ICBM development in the Cold War nuclear arms race, the need for the ability to manufacture precision miniature ball bearings for guidance systems increased. Since the Russians, in the early 1960s, did not posssess the capability to mass produce such ball bearings, there was a surge in Russian attempts to get access to the technology. Primarily this technology, in the early 1960s, was the Centalign B machine manufactured by BCGC. In 1960, Russia made its first attempt to purchase 45 of the machines. BCGC was willing to provide the 45 Centalign B units, but had to apply to the Commerce Department for an export license. This led to Congressional Hearings during which the Pentagon, and the President of Miniature Precision Bearing Company, Horace D. Gilbert, warned that the miniature ball bearings were primarily used for military purposes and that providing the Centalign B machines to Moscow was a threat to national security. The Russians failed to obtain the machines in 1960. The atmosphere changed in 1972, and election year in the United States, as President Richard M. Nixon used foreign policy "breakthroughs" to steamroll his way to winning in a huge landslide. Both of these breakthroughs had future consequences for America. The first was extending diplomatic relations with China and moving toward the trade "relationship" we have with China today. The second was the "detente" with the Soviet Union (Russia) that led to such transfers of technology as the Kama River truck foundry, the largest such plant in the world at that time, and the sale of 164 Centalign B machines to Russia. The Russians now had the tools to change 20 megaton single warheads on their ICMBs with the number of MIRV warheads that would make up the payload of 20 megatons. It took the ability to mass produce accelerometers and miniature precision ball bearings for the Russians to achieve this huge strategic nuclear advantage.
When the deal for 164 Centalign B machines was quickly approved by the Nixon Commerce Department, Anatoliy Kostousov, Russian Minister of the Machine Tool Industry, explained the large number of Centalign B machines in that order this way: "In all, we need to manufacture five times more bearings than 12 years ago." Kostousov's reference to 12 years was the first attempt by Russia to buy 45 such machines.
Author of National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union (Russia) observed about Kostousov's lament about the 12 years the Russians had to wait: "That makes sense--the Soviets (Russians) have five times more missiles than they had twelve years ago."
The more radical transfers of US technology and capital to China from 1973 through the present day is even more breathtaking in the swiftness of its results, a China that is a nuclear superpower with a huge conventional military with modern weapons they make in China, and a deep water navy that is planning to have four nuclear powered aircraft carriers built by the end of the 2020s, all the result of technological and wealth transfers to China that dwarfed those provided to Russia.
Is this an accident of some kind? Is this the result of poor decision making?
Is it something else?
To repeat the first paragraph of this part of the story, "During World War II, the US Army Air Corps expended a high portion of their strategic bomber force to knock out German production of ball bearings." Did something happen between 1942 and 2019 about which we do not know? Did something happen to make ball bearings irrelevant to the production of modern military machinery and weapons? Is there anyone out there stupid enough to make such a claim?